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United States v. Gourde:
Curtailing Privacy in the Technological World
Joseph Perera*
I. INTRODUCTION
Americans expect a certain amount of privacy in their lives. Since com-
puters have become a prominent part of life, Americans expect that princi-
ples of privacy apply to their computer use as well. While many use
computers to help make life easier, some use technology for illegal purposes.
Like any other tool of crime, technology may become evidence that the gov-
ernment can seize and search in order to prosecute criminals. But, like any
other government seizure, the government's power to investigate must be
balanced with the privacy rights of individuals.
Recently, several cases involving the search and seizure of computers
owned by accused collectors of child pornography have dealt with the scope
of probable cause within the context of technology. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit delivered a ruling in United States v. Gourde
that gives the government more leeway in establishing probable cause for the
search and seizure of an individual's computer.' The opinion provides prece-
dent that increases the power of the government at the expense of the privacy
of computer users.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In August 2001, an FBI agent came across the website Lolitagurls.com,
which contained "images of nude and partially-dressed girls, some
prepubescent."2 The website contained the language "THIS SITE updated
weekly WITH NEW LOLITA PICS. This site is in full compliance with
United States Code Title 18 Part I Chapter 110 Section 2256."3 The website
offered viewers three ways to access further pages on the site: "(1) take a free
tour of the site, (2) become a new member of the site, or (3) log in as a
returning member."4 To become a member, a viewer would submit their
credit card information to the website and the card would be charged $19.95
a month.5 "Members received unlimited access to the website and . . .
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[could] . . . download images directly from the website."6 The FBI agent
registered as a member of Lolitagurls.com and "captured hundreds of images
that included adult pornography, child pornography, and child erotica."7
In January 2002, the FBI had "identified the owner and operator of
Lolitagurls.com and . . . executed a search warrant" and seized several
items.8 One of these items was the owner's computer containing images that
had been displayed on the website.9 The owner admitted that he operated the
child pornography website, Lolitagurls.com, for a profit.o
The FBI issued a subpoena to the company that handled the credit card
processing for Lolitagurls.com and obtained records about the website's sub-
scribers.1 These "records listed Gourde as a member and provided his ad-
dress, date of birth, e-mail address and the fact that he had been a subscriber
from November 2001 until January 2002."12 With this information and the
information provided in an affidavit by Agent David Moriguchi, the FBI ob-
tained a search warrant from a magistrate judge to search Gourde's residence
and computers.13 Pursuant to this order, the FBI seized Gourde's "computer,
which contained over 100 images of child pornography and child erotica."14
Gourde filed a motion to suppress the images taken from his computer,
but the court applied a "common-sense" approach and denied the motion.1
The court held that evidence of a subscription to a website containing both
legal and illegal pornography "provided the necessary 'fair probability' to
'look further.' "16 Gourde then "pleaded guilty to one count of possession of
visual depictions of minors in explicit conduct in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2252(a)(4)(B), 2252(b)(2) and 2256."17 "Gourde conditioned his plea on
his right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress."18
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit subsequently held that the affida-
vit "failed to establish a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a







12. Id. at 1067-68.
13. Id. at 1068.
14. Id. at 1067-68.
15. See id. at 1068-69.




motion to suppress.' 9 The Ninth Circuit later decided to rehear the case en
banc.20
Il. THE COURT'S HOLDING AND ANALYSIS
Circuit Judge McKeown began the opinion with an analysis of the
Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.21 The Fourth Amendment pro-
hibits "unreasonable search and seizures" and provides that "no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation."22
The U.S. Supreme Court examined the issue of probable cause within the
Fourth Amendment context in Illinois v. Gates.23 In Gates, the Court em-
ployed a "totality of the circumstances" test and defined probable cause as
"fair probability;" neither certainty nor a preponderance of the evidence is
necessary. 24 To issue a search warrant, a judge needs only to answer the
"commonsense practical question whether there is 'probable cause' to be-
lieve that contraband or evidence is located in a particular place."25 A proba-
ble cause determination may be based partly on reasonable inferences.26
The court then examined the content of the website itself.27 Gourde
argued that the affidavit failed because it did not properly describe the con-
tents of Lolitagurls.com.28 However, since the owner of the site admitted
that it was a child pornography website, "the magistrate judge had no reason
to question whether the images described constituted child pornography,"
thus quashing Gourde's objections.29 Furthermore, the website's disclaimer
stating that the website complied with federal law functioned only as "mere
window dressing that absolves the owner or users of nothing."30
Having established that the site contained illegal images, the court next
established that Gourde both had access and wanted access to these images.
Since Gourde was a paying subscriber to a child pornography site for over
two months, he had the opportunity to download and keep these images in
19. United States v. Gourde (Gourde 1), 382 F.3d 1003, 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 2004).
20. United States v. Gourde (Gourde I1), 416 F.3d 961 (9th Cir. 2005).
21. Gourde III, 440 F.3d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir. 2006).
22. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
23. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
24. Id. at 241, 246.
25. Id. at 230.
26. See id. at 240.
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violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252.31 By submitting his home address, e-mail
address, credit card information and authorizing a monthly charge, Gourde's
actions to gain access to the site were clearly intentional.32 This evidence
supports the conclusion that "Gourde had paid to obtain unlimited access to
images of child pornography knowingly and willingly, and not involuntary,
unwittingly, or even passively" and that there was a "near certainty that his
computer would contain evidence of a crime had he received or downloaded
images in violation of § 2252."33 The court stated that his computer would
contain a "digital footprint" of any downloaded images and that an expert
could restore the images, even if Gourde had made an effort to erase them.34
Since the affidavit established that "the site had illegal images, Gourde
intended to have and wanted access to these images, and these images were
almost certainly retrievable from his computer," the magistrate judge only
needed to infer that there was a "fair probability" that Gourd had received or
downloaded illegal images in order to find probable cause for the search
warrant.35 The court held that such an inference successfully met the "fair
probability" test stating that "it neither strains logic nor defies common sense
to conclude, based on the totality of these circumstances, that someone who
paid for access for two months to a website that actually purveyed child
pornography probably had viewed or downloaded such images onto his
computer."36
Additionally, the affidavit's profile of child pornographers and their use
of computers strengthened the inference that Gourde received or downloaded
images.37 The affidavit described child pornographers as "pack rats," collect-
ing images of child pornography for sexual gratification, rarely disposing of
the sexually explicit images, and "seek[ing] out like-minded individuals, ei-
ther in person or on the Internet."38 Agent Mariguchi argued in the affidavit
that Gourde fit the profile of a child pornography collector because he joined
a subscription website that would allow him to view these images in pri-
vacy.39 The court likened Mariguchi's affidavit to the one found in United
States v. Martin, in which the affidavit's profile of child pornography collec-
31. Id.
32. See id.




37. Id. at 1072; see also United States v. Hay, 231 F.3d 630, 636 (9th Cir. 2000)
(reasoning that the magistrate judge could possibly conclude files were on a
computer based on a collector profile).
38. Gourde III, 440 F.3d at 1068, 1072.
39. Id. at 1072.
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tors supported a finding of probable cause.40 Like Mariguchi's affidavit, the
affidavit in Martin "contained an extensive background discussion of the mo-
dus operandi of those who use computers for collecting and distributing child
pornography, including their reliance on e-groups, e-mail, bulletin boards,
file transfers, and online storage."41 The Ninth Circuit found the decisions of
other circuit courts, helpful in their conclusions that the profile of child
pornographers found in such affidavits "rose to the level of 'fair
probability'" that the accused had received or downloaded illegal images,
and established probable cause to issue a search warrant.42
Next, the court addressed Gourde's argument that probable cause was
lacking because the FBI could have determined whether Gourde had
downloaded the illegal images by searching for records of downloads from
the seized computer of the "Lolitagurls.com" owner. 43 Without such tangible
data, Gourde argued that "the profile data and other facts are insufficient to
support a warrant."44 The court rejected this argument, stating that such a
ruling would transform the probable cause standard from "a 'fair probability'
to a 'near certainty' that Gourde had received or possessed illegal images."45
Instead, under the Gates analysis, the government was not required to show
more information than needed to show a "fair probability" that Gourde re-
ceived or possessed the images.46 Furthermore, the Supreme Court's test did
not require the affidavit to contain facts that made it "'more likely true than
false' that Gourde possessed child pornography."47
Finally, the Ninth Circuit distinguished Gourde's case from that of
United States v. Weber.48 In that case, Weber was targeted for investigation
after he failed to pick up a package addressed to him that contained two
advertisements depicting child pornography.49 Two years later, Weber or-
40. Id.; see also United States v. Martin, 426 F.3d 68, 75 (2d Cir. 2005).
41. Gourde III, 440 F.3d at 1072 (quoting Martin, 426 F.3d at 75).
42. See Gourde III, 440 F.3d at 1072; see also United States v. Riccardi, 405 F.3d
852, 860-61 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that an affidavit containing a statement
that "possessors of child pornography often obtain and retain images of child
pornography on their computers," and other facts were "more than enough to
support" probable cause); United States v. Chrobak, 289 F.3d 1043, 1046 (8th
Cir. 2002) (holding that an affidavit's statement that based on "professional
experience ... child pornographers generally retain their pornography for ex-
tended periods," was enough to support probable cause).
43. Gourde III, 440 F.3d at 1072.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1073.
46. Id.
47. Id. (citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983)).
48. Id. at 1073-74; United States v. Weber, 923 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1991).
49. Weber, 923 F.2d at 1340.
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dered, sight unseen, four pictures advertised as child pornography from a
fictitious advertisement sent by the Customs Service.50 The affidavit for the
search warrant provided the details of these incidents and a general descrip-
tion of child pornography collectors but did not connect Weber with these
profiles and did not address the two year lag between the first and second
incidents.5l The Weber court reversed the denial of the suppression motion
because the issuance of a warrant under such facts would justify searching
the house of any individual that tried to order child pornography, even if they
did not receive it.52 Furthermore, the court ruled the affidavit was deficient
because it did not illustrate that Weber matched the profile of a pedophile or
collector of child pornography.53
Gourde's case was factually different from Weber. Gourde had taken
"continuous, affirmative steps to access a child pornography website,"
whereas Weber had involved a single transaction that occurred two years
after an "initial, and unconsummated, foray into child pornography."54 Also,
the Moriguchi affidavit showed the link between Gourde and the child por-
nography collector profiles while the Weber affidavit had failed to do so. 55
The Ninth Circuit, employing the Gates analysis of the Fourth Amend-
ment, concluded that the search warrant was supported by probable cause.56
Having reached this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court
did not err in denying Gourde's motion to suppress the images found on his
computer.57 The Court affirmed Gourde's conviction and remanded the case
to a three-judge panel to rule on Gourde's request for a limited remand.58
IV. RHEINHARDT DISSENT
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Rheinhardt argued that the majority
failed to consider the "totality of the circumstances" because it ignored the
fact that "[a]t the time the government sought the warrant, it possessed direct
evidence that established whether Gourde in fact had or had not downloaded
illegal images."59 Judge Rheinhardt labeled the government's failure to ex-
amine the website owner's computer for records of Gourde's activity as a
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1341.
52. Id. at 1344.
53. Id. at 1345.
54. Gourde II1, 440 F.3d 1065, 1074 (9th Cir. 2006); Weber, 923 F.2d at 1340.
55. Gourde III, 440 F.3d at 1074; Weber, 923 F.2d at 1341.
56. Gourde III, 440 F.3d at 1071.
57. Id. at 1074.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1074-75 (Rheinhardt, J., dissenting).
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"conscious avoidance."60 He argued that given these circumstances, Gourde
had a valid Franks claim because "material omissions from the affidavit led
the magistrate to issue a warrant for which there was no probable cause."61 If
the magistrate had known that the government had made such an omission,
Judge Rheinhardt argued, he would probably not have issued the warrant.62
Judge Rheinhardt argued that because the majority ignored the fact that the
FBI admitted that it possessed evidence that would have determined whether
Gourde had received child pornography and failed to provide this evidence,
the majority did not properly consider "the totality of the circumstances" and
erred in holding that government established probable cause.63
V. KLEINFELD DISSENT
Judge Kleinfeld also dissented from the majority. He disagreed with the
assumption that an individual "who subscribes to an Internet site with both
illegal and legal material must collect illegal material from the site."64 Judge
Kleinfeld argued that the court failed to consider that Gourde might have
subscribed solely to look at the legal images.65 According to Judge
Kleinfeld, there were several indications suggesting that individuals would
subscribe to the site to access the legal information.66
Next, Judge Kleinfeld noted the distinction between viewing child por-
nography and possessing child pornography. The applicable federal statutes
punish an individual who "knowingly transports or ships . . . receives ... or
reproduces" child pornography; however, the statutes do not list "viewing" as
a criminal activity.67 Judge Kleinfeld noted that although "precedent does
not settle the question, it does not square with common sense to treat looking
as knowingly receiving."68 Additionally, information in the browser's cache
is not "received," as "the cache is an area of memory and disk space availa-
60. Id. at 1075.
61. Id. at 1075 n.2; see Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 156 (1978) (holding that
if a defendant can establish perjury or reckless disregard by a "preponderance
of the evidence, and, with the affidavit's false material set to one side, the
affidavit's remaining content is insufficient to establish probably cause, the
search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded to the same
extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit.")
62. Gourde III, 440 F.3d at 1076 (Rheinhardt, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 1077.
64. Id. at 1084 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 1078.
66. Id. at 1079. These include the language, "This site is in full compliance with
United States Code Title 18 Part I Chapter 110 Section 2256," and that much of
the material on the site was legal pornography. Id.
67. Id. at 1079-1081; see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252, 2252A (2000).
68. Gourde III, 440 F.3d at 1081 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
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ble to the browser software, not the computer user."69 The browser software
displays the web page from the cache "to save download time and web traf-
fic," if "the computer accesses the same page .. before the cache is over-
written."70 However, the user cannot view the picture offline unless the user
has downloaded the picture and saved as a JPEG or a PDF.71 "Receiving"
also implies possession, which "requires dominion and control."72 Since a
user does not have dominion and control of an image while it is in the cache,
viewing a webpage is not analogous to possession.73
Finally, Judge Kleinfeld stated that the "totality of the circumstances"
includes a consideration of "the legal environment in which the individual
lives."74 Individuals might participate in many prohibited activities were it
not for the legal penalties that result.75 Therefore, in light of the legal risks
attached to the download of child pornography, Judge Kleinfeld argued it
would take more than inferences to establish probable cause. 76
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF THE COURT'S HOLDING
The Ninth Circuit's holding in Gourde greatly expands the "fair
probability" standards in determining probable cause. This holding suggests
that probable cause to search and seize an individual's computer can be es-
tablished by the fact that (1) a website or data storage unit contained illegal
material,77 (2) an individual took affirmative action that would give them
access to this material,78 and (3) these actions match a profile of individuals
that commit the crime.79 These parameters severely endanger everyone's pri-
vacy in the realm of technology.
First, the holding does not differentiate between a "mixed website" that
contains legal and illegal images and one that contains only illegal images -
it is enough that the website possessed some illegal material. The court
states that the "disclaimer" on the website was "mere window dressing that
absolves the owners or users of nothing."80 Internet users, therefore, cannot
rely on the statements made on the website. The court is only concerned





74. Id. at 1083.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1084.
77. See id. at 1070 (majority opinion).
78. See id. at 1070-71.
79. See id. at 1072.
80. Id. at 1070.
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with the existence of illegal material, despite the fact that the site has also has
accessible permissible material. Therefore, it is possible that a user may ac-
cess illegal information under the belief that they are accessing acceptable
material. This analysis poses a problem if extended to the realm of servers
and other data storage units. For example, a shared server may be used by
several users. Its purpose is to facilitate work projects by providing access to
information for the several users. But if the server also contains images of
child pornography, does this constitute enough to meet the first requirement?
Extending the court's analysis, it would seem that such a server would meet
the requirement.
Second, the court argues that an individual's affirmative action to access
a website (in contrast to stumbling on the illegal content) manifests an "in-
tention and desire" to obtain the information on the website.81 For the court,
the fact that Gourde paid for access to the images implied that he possessed
these images. The court forms its basis on the notion that when Gourde
accessed the website, the images would remain on the computer in the form
of a "digital footprint."82 Furthermore, the court appears to equate viewing
an image with "receiving" and "possessing" the image. The court fails to
address Judge Kleinfeld's arguments concerning the difference between
"view" and "receive," and the notion of "possession," within the context of
internet browsers.83 Since an individual cannot view the image from the
cache while he is offline until he has downloaded it in some form, he cannot
have "dominion and control" over the image while he views it on his web
browser.84 Additionally, the court simply ignores the possibility that Gourde
may have subscribed to the site to view the legal images only. Under the
court's analysis, a user "possesses" any information that he views while on
the Internet. Therefore, when one accesses the McDonald's website, the
viewer "possesses" the images of Ronald McDonald. This hardly fits the
common conception of possession, yet the court equates any affirmative ac-
tion to access a website as a desire to possess information and possession
itself.
Third, the court holds that if the activities of an individual are similar to
those matching the profile of a child pornography collector, this establishes
grounds for probable cause.85 The affidavit in Gourde stated that collectors
of child pornography act like "pack rats," that they use the Internet to seek
out like-minded individuals, trade and obtain illegal images, and store these
images for a long period of time.86 Since Gourde had accessed a website that
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1071.
83. See id. at 1081-82 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
84. See id. at 1082.
85. See id. at 1072 (majority opinion).
86. Id.
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contained child pornography, the court determines that there is a "fair
probability" that he was a child pornography collector and would have these
images on his computer. Here, the court seems to imply that a general re-
semblance to a profile is a "fair probability" that the subject meets that pro-
file. Even if the government possesses evidence that could establish whether
or not the subject actually is a member of the violating class (in this case, the
computer of the website's owner), the government can use circumstantial
evidence from a profile to stack inference upon inference to establish proba-
ble cause.
This holding has dangerous implications regarding technological pri-
vacy in today's society. For example, X, unbeknownst to the rest of his
friends, has a large collection of child pornography on his computer. In order
to find more opportunities to add to his collection, X joins an internet social
network such as MySpace to find other collectors of child pornography. X
uses MySpace to share and receive illegal images. On his MySpace profile,
X not only displays photo albums of his trips around the world and surveys
about his favorite movies, but also includes a cleverly disguised link for or-
dering pizza to access his pornography collection. But X also uses MySpace
to stay in contact with Y, his old roommate from college and proud new
father. Y has no interest in child pornography, nor does he know that X
collects child pornography. Y's primary reasons for accessing X's MySpace
page are to reminisce with his old friend and see pictures of X's travels
around the world. The FBI targets X as a collector of child pornography,
seizes his computer, and finds the collection of illegal images. While search-
ing the computer, the FBI notices that Y is a part of X's network of friends
on MySpace. The government seeks to obtain a search warrant and seize Y's
computer. It bases its request on an affidavit that because Y was a friend of
X on MySpace, and X had a massive collection of child pornography on his
computer, Y's computer must also contain child pornography
According to the Ninth Circuit's holding in Gourde, this would be
enough to search Y's computer because all three elements are met. Although
X's MySpace profile contained legal images and information that were of
interest to Y, the fact that there was a link, albeit a deceitful one, to access
illegal images satisfies the first element. Second, by joining X's network of
friends and viewing X's MySpace profile, Y took affirmative action to access
a website that contained illegal images. And finally, Y's use of MySpace fits
the profile of child pornography collectors because he was using computer
resources to find like-minded individuals and to view information in relative
privacy.
This example shows how extensively the Gourde decision might affect
computer users. If the government seizes the computer of a child
pornographer, the government can assert "fair probability" to seize the com-
puters of anyone in that user's internet social networks, instant messenger list
or e-mail address book. The Gourde decision may lead to a serious infringe-




Near the end of the Gourde opinion, the Ninth Circuit commented, "we
are acutely aware that the digital universe poses particular challenges with
respect to the Fourth Amendment."87 Yet this decision does not seem to
protect privacy interests, a main concern of the Fourth Amendment. Courts
should not "grow lax in their duty to protect our right to privacy and...
remain vigilant against efforts to weaken our Fourth Amendment protec-
tions."88 Instead, this decision infringes upon people's right to privacy to a
greater extent. Computers have become an integral part of our lives. We use
them for work, for school and for pleasure. Our computers contain a wealth
of personal information: term papers, appellate briefs, financial and medical
records, and correspondence from loved ones. Some of our most private and
intimate thoughts are stored within the hard drives of these machines. This
decision, however, provides the government with a broad justification to
seize our computers and reveal the personal information they contain. The
Gourde decision effectively curtails the right of privacy in a key area of our
increasingly technological society.
87. Id. at 1074.
88. Id. (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). As well, it should be noted that the majority
opinion uses the same cautionary words. Id.
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